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INTRODUCTION
The rapid pace of discovery in the life-
sciences can have profound implications
for public health, and the focus of much
deliberation in recent years has been on
how best to ensure that they are positive
and not negative. A key focus of debate
has been on dual-use research of con-
cern (DURC), which has been defined as
life-science research that “could be directly
misapplied to pose a significant threat
with broad potential consequences to pub-
lic health and safety, agricultural crops,
and other plants, animals, the environ-
ment, materiel, or national security (1).”
Debates such as the one that surrounded
gain-of-function (GOF) research on avian
influenza have led to many existential
questions about contemporary life-science
research, including whether or not such
research should even be conducted in the
first place, what viable alternative exper-
imental approaches exist, if or how the
findings should be made public, and how –
or whether – such research can be gov-
erned (2–6).
Responding to these questions at a
policy level necessarily involve a broader
sphere of actors than life scientists alone as
they have potential ramifications in differ-
ent sectors and for society-at-large. Often,
it is the security and research commu-
nities that have been at the frontline of
such debates and driving policy. The pub-
lic health community tends to enter the
fray at later stages, such as after the com-
pletion of “concerning” research, at which
point it is asked to either facilitate discus-
sion or comment on the potential public
health risks and benefits of research (7, 8).
By that stage, public health organizations
risk being viewed of as a partisan supporter
of dual-use research (9).
In this paper, we demonstrate how the
public health sector could more substan-
tially contribute to the debate, guide pol-
icy decisions, and promote actions along
all phases of the research life-cycle. Before
doing so, we articulate the key aspects of
the dual-use debate as they are relevant to
public health.
“DO NO HARM”: PUBLIC HEALTH AND
DUAL-USE RESEARCH
Medical research is intended to promote
the health of humans at an individual and
a population level along a set of ethical
principles laid down in the Declaration
of Helsinki1 and overarching professional
ethos in health care to “above all, do no
harm” – primum non-nocere. What com-
plicates matters with regards to the dual-
use research in the area of health is that
harm could potentially be done by both
promoting and preventing research. On
the one hand, research fuels innovation
in new medicines, vaccines, and diagnos-
tics, which are fundamental components
of public health intervention strategies.
The fine balance required for tightening
up the regulation of life-science research
may, in some instances, lead to some
undesirable consequences, such as greater
barriers and costs for doing research on
listed agents2 (10). On the other hand,
promoting DURC increases the possibility
of malevolent use, through providing the
information or material that would help
state or non-state actors to develop agents
for a biological attack. After pathogens
are modified or created, responsibilities
are created for their physical containment;
the issue is thus one of both laboratory
biosafety and biosecurity. Even more prob-
lematically, once DURC experiments are
published, it is nearly impossible to con-
trol access to information. In this sense
discussions about the risks and benefits of
DURC nearly always occur too late – ide-
ally, they should occur before and not after
the research has been conducted.
The wide spectrum of potentially prob-
lematic issues related to dual-use research
necessitates multi-stakeholder engagement
including life-science researchers, research
funders, regulators, the scientific media,
ethicists, social scientists, and security com-
munities. In addition, given the potential
societal implications of the topic, greater
transparency, and public engagement sur-
rounding dual-use debates is required (11).
There are numerous highly debated
issues that have surrounded dual-use
research. At the broadest level has been
the question of what sorts of life-science
research should be conducted, and what
constitutes DURC (12, 13). Regulatory
measures, such as security clearances for
researchers and export controls (10, 14)
as well as other risk mitigation mea-
sures (1) have been contemplated alongside
1http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/, accessed June 7, 2014.
2http://www.australiagroup.net/en/human_animal_pathogens.html, accessed May 15, 2014
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self-governance measures such as raised
awareness and codes of conduct and
continued professional development for
life scientists (15–18). Furthermore, much
attention has focused on whether or how
results should be published (6, 19) and
how practical measures, such as enhanced
laboratory biorisk management processes
along (global) standards, can be achieved
(7, 20).
From the perspective of public health,
these are all important discussions, each
aimed at identifying and mitigating poten-
tial harm. However, in order to ensure bet-
ter integration of public health aspects into
future policies and actions, a few other key
issues must be addressed. One relates to
the way in which risk assessments of spe-
cific dual-use issues could be strengthened.
Another builds upon previous arguments
for managing dual-use research by taking
into account risk-based approaches and
biorisk (biosafety and biosecurity) man-
agement in all areas of implementation of
the research cycle (7, 21). Addressing all of
these public health relevant aspects could
offer a next step in structuring the dual-
use debate into options to mitigate harm
through joint action between the research,
security, and policy making communities.
REDUCING INFORMATION
ASYMMETRIES IN RISK
ASSESSMENTS
A striking feature of the dual-use debate is
that the benefits to public health are often
invoked, regardless of the extent to which
actors in the public health sector have been
consulted. This is particularly ironic given
that one core area of public health exper-
tise is the undertaking of risk assessments.
For example, one of the rationales for mov-
ing beyond the moratorium on publish-
ing A(H5N1) transmission studies was they
were“essential for pandemic preparedness”
(4). This statement was made after an
expert consultation organized by the World
Health Organisation (WHO) in February
2012 (7). However, it is important to note
that the WHO consultation occurred after
the research had been completed and this
consultation has been criticized for the
absence of a broad range of expertise3. It
should furthermore be noted that although
the obtained study results are of scientific
value, some have pointed out that incorpo-
rating detailed sequencing studies on the
viral samples from infected patients is, for
many countries, likely not the most feasi-
ble or effective way of strengthening global
pandemic preparedness in the short term
(19, 22). Previous research has noted that
there are, globally, key gaps in viral sample
collection and analysis (23). In addition,
although the longer-term benefits may well
be substantial, translating the findings from
advanced life-science research into tangi-
ble and usable products and knowledge can
take years, if not decades.
It is essential to keep in mind that
advanced research is not always pre-
dictable. Discoveries can be serendipitous
and researchers themselves may not always
be able to predict what sort of outcomes
certain experiments might lead to. The
point here is not to argue against advanced
life-science research but to caution against
the creation of overly ambitious expecta-
tions, particularly, if these will be the basis
for risk-benefit discussions about dual-use
research. Scholars of science and inno-
vation, for example, have long observed
that the creation of sometimes overly opti-
mistic expectations about the future ben-
efits of research helps to secure funding
and lower regulatory hurdles (24, 25). Sim-
ilarly, it has been pointed out that large
funding bodies bring particular interests
and institutional cultures to the dual-use
debate, one which tends to emphasize the
positive benefits of such research (9). In
the specific example of GOF research on
influenza viruses, it is notable that at least
a few prominent scientists believed that
the benefits had been overstated (22, 26,
27). One way of mitigating the devel-
opment of over-expectations for research
is to ensure balanced debate and doing
so could be achieved by comprehensively
including a broader range of perspectives,
including public health, in both pre- and
post-experimental discussions (11, 26).
There is another important information
asymmetry on the other side of the spec-
trum in debates about dual-use research.
This relates to the intents and capabilities of
would-be bioterrorists and how this affects
risk assessments (28). Presumably, the
principle reason for worrying about pub-
lishing experimental protocols or genomic
information relates to the concern that
rogue scientists could replicate the results
with malevolent aims. Given the rapid
advances in life-science research, the advent
of synthetic genomics and the numerous
social issues that it raises (29, 30), and the
declining costs of doing research, it would
seem quite reasonable indeed that a wider
range of actors might be able to repli-
cate advanced research. Yet this assump-
tion may appear to overstate the ease with
which advanced research can be under-
taken, which relies not only on informa-
tion and materials but on experimental
know-how and tacit knowledge (31). The
recent history of actual bioterrorist events
as well as the findings from a risk analysis
appears to support this claim (32). This is a
key point. Overstating – or understating –
the capabilities and intents of bioterrorists
can affect the perception of the “riskiness”
of research. Here, the public health sector
needs to raise and reiterate the importance
of this question. The aim should be to
ensure risk assessments integrate the best
available information from a variety of sec-
tors, meaning that life scientists, regulators,
ethicists, public health actors, and the secu-
rity and intelligence communities will need
to become more adept at and comfortable
with exchanging information and ideas.
This has not always been the case.
ADDRESSING ALL PHASES OF THE
RESEARCH CYCLE
The WHO advocated managing dual-use
risks by taking account of all stages of the
research cycle, which is an approach that
we would like to briefly elaborate upon
here (7). Public health activities already
encompass many of these phases, and thus
existing expertise could be harnessed to
ensure a broad and comprehensive public
health engagement with dual-use research
(Table 1). Following the discussion above,
in the “pre-research” phase, the public
health sector could contribute to discus-
sions about the possible risks and bene-
fits of research through consultation with
research funding bodies, scientists, and
institutional review boards. In addition,
good laboratory practice means following
3http://www.psandman.com/col/WHO-H5N1.htm, accessed May 14, 2014
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Table 1 | Examples of public health risk mitigation strategies along the phases of the research cycle.
Research phase Examples of public health risk assessment and mitigation measures
Pre-research Advocate compliance with international obligations and treaties including:
• Biological and toxin weapons convention
• National legislation in place and oversight bodies aligned with EU regulations
• Assessment of public health benefits versus the risk of DURC
• Harmonized and updated ethics/biosecurity protocols
Promote laboratory biorisk management system according to good practices and standards along the lines of CEN15793:2011 and
WHO guidelines in biosafety and biosecurity. This would include:
• Plan experimental needs according to risk assessments
• Ensure availability of appropriate laboratory facilities
• Continuing education of life scientists
• Ensure researchers have the necessary security clearance
During research Promote laboratory biorisk management system according to good practices and standards along the lines of CEN15793:2011 and
WHO guidelines in biosafety and biosecurity. This would include:
• Ensuring laboratory biosafety standard operating procedures (SOPs) for DURC occurring at research institutes – i.e., responsible
biosafety officer role, appropriate facilities, well-trained staff, security clearance of scientists, appropriate facility oversight,
well-trained staff, etc.
• Reporting promptly any accidents or laboratory acquired infections to the defined authority in the SOPs
Post-research Support discussion of the public health importance of findings and how the knowledge can support future public health
programs/actions
All phases Advocate for overall public health system capabilities such as:
• Sufficient laboratory capacity for timely and reliable detection of infectious disease health threats
• Harmonized biorisk management practices and strengthened investments in supportive research to address any gaps in practice
• Education programs and continued professional development to build a culture of scientific responsibility
• Ensuring public health perspectives in dealing with policy developments for DURC
• Public health contribution to guide research priorities
• Building and maintaining relationships with stakeholders (e.g., research funding, research, science publishing, and security
communities)
ethical and legal guidelines for conduct-
ing research on infectious diseases, and for
ensuring that robust biorisk management
systems are in place. Some European pub-
lic health institutes have developed tools to
facilitate this, such as the Dutch Biosecurity
Self-Scan Toolkit4 or the German devel-
opment of codes of conduct for potential
dual-use research5.
During research, biorisk and biosecu-
rity managers should communicate with
researchers about emerging findings, and
should regularly monitor the adherence
to laboratory biosafety and biosecurity
standards for research deemed potentially
“risky.” It is essential to remember that
all laboratory research carries a risk. The
public health consequences of laboratory
accidents are quite serious, particularly
if the possibility exists that laboratory-
infected workers expose the general public,
as nearly happened with SARS (33). Early
communication with public health agen-
cies about findings likely to generate par-
ticular attention could also occur during
this phase.
Post-research, a clear discussion on the
potential public health benefits should be
incorporated into risk analyses concern-
ing the implications and publication of
findings. Existing protocols for the physi-
cal containment of experimental materials
should be reviewed and, if necessary,
strengthened should DURC be approved.
The recent misplacement of samples of
SARS, anthrax and smallpox demonstrates
the continued importance of maintaining
high biosafety and biosecurity standards
for storing physical specimens6,7.
During all phases of the research cycle,
the public health sector works to strengthen
its core functions such as surveillance,
preparedness, prevention, response, risk
communication, and training. In regions
where vast amounts of funding dedicated
to potentially “risky” life-science research,
the public health community should argue
for a greater role in participating in research
funding prioritization, and risk-benefit
assessments. It could also make the case for
strengthened and sustainable investments
4http://www.biosecuritytoolkit.com/mainMenu.html;jsessionid=AAE30461C0ABD5A9A0D7BC33E91DBBD5, accessed May 20, 2014.
5http://www.rki.de/EN/Content/Institute/Dual_Use/code_of_conduct.html;jsessionid=A2FBBD63B5FE63F62EC4B84C0603C295.2_cid298?nn=4005636, accessed May
20, 2014.
6http://www.pasteur.fr/fr/institut-pasteur/presse/documents-presse/communique-presse-l-institut-pasteur, accessed May 20, 2014.
7http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2014/p0711-lab-safety.html, accessed August 4, 2014
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in biosafety, biosecurity, and core pub-
lic health services: should a dangerous
pathogen be released, whether intention-
ally or unintentionally, then strengthened
general defenses against infectious diseases
will be essential. Finally, but essentially,
should the public health sector seek to
develop the role of “honest broker” in dual-
use discussions, then it will need to work
seriously at fostering engagement with key
stakeholders, such as security communities
and ethicists in addition to life scientists so
as to ensure a comprehensive “web of pro-
tection” (4). Hosting international meet-
ings focused on bringing together scien-
tists, the security community, public health
workers, regulators and possibly even the
public could be an initial way of engag-
ing important sectors of society in the
debate.
CONCLUSION
Advances in life-science research are stag-
gering with the advent of synthetic biology,
the latest in a long line of technological
breakthroughs. There is little to suggest
that this pace of change will slow in the
future and the increasingly global nature
of science means that all countries have
a stake in ensuring that research is con-
ducted and disseminated responsibly. Thus
far, debates about dual-use research have
tended to invoke public health rationales
but there is much room for improvement
for ensuring that public health perspectives
are fully integrated into discussions. This
will be challenging, and mechanisms and
fora for doing so will need to be created.
Yet there is much to be gained from doing
so, for the ethics behind the debate closely
matches the public health ethos: primum
non-nocere.
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